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I.

INTRODUCTION

After the Supreme Court hands down an opinion about arbitration, scholars debate what it
means to the law of arbitration and service providers decide how it will affect cases in practice.
Some Court decisions change the manner and scope of the cases a provider may administer.
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds International Corp. 1 and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion 2
changed class action arbitration for ongoing and future cases.
Class arbitration began in earnest as a result of the Court’s directive in 2003 in Greentree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle where the court allowed that an arbitration clause silent on the issue of
class arbitration could be found by an arbitrator to permit class adjudication.3 Having selected
arbitration rather than litigation, parties with small claims from the same contract were able to
form putative classes and take steps to be certified and move their claims forward in arbitration.
From this decision, arbitrators were viewed to have gained the authority to grant class status to
groups of similarly situated Claimants 4 and over the next eight years the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”) saw 347 class arbitration cases filed under Class Arbitration Rules that
were issued shortly after the Bazzle decision. Special panels of arbitrators, a public class action
docket, and a dedicated team of case managers came into being as the AAA sought to
administrate these cases fairly and openly.
A sea change to class arbitration arrived with Stolt-Nielsen’s pronouncement that the
arbitrators in that case exceeded their powers when they certified a putative class without a basis
in law or express contractual evidence of the parties’ desire to arbitrate as a class.5 Questions
surfaced. Was class arbitration dead? As parties are unlikely to agree pre-dispute to a process
that may apply to an unknown class for an unanticipated dispute, and even more unlikely to agree
to class arbitration post-dispute, the Court appeared to raise significant questions about the
viability of class arbitration. And if there were no class arbitrations, did state court rulings that
class action waivers in arbitration agreements were unconscionable mean parties were required to
arbitrate as individuals or to litigate their claims? Could the absence of arbitrators’ authority to
permit a class action arbitration to proceed where the arbitration agreement is silent on the issue
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mean that class arbitration cases would no longer be filed and the existing cases would be
terminated?
In 2011, the Court held that a class action waiver contained in an arbitration agreement
could be enforced thereby negating California’s Discover Bank rule. 6 In doing so, the Court
directed the parties to arbitrate as individuals. In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the Court
referenced its prior holding in Stolt-Nielsen, stating:
We then held that the agreement at issue, which was silent on the
question of class procedures, could not be interpreted to allow them
because the “changes brought about by the shift from bilateral
arbitration to class-action arbitration” are “fundamental.” 7

Further, when addressing the public policy arguments that were asserted in favor of class
actions the Court held “States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even
if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.” 8 Thus after Concepcion, arbitration clauses with class
action waivers could be enforced despite the existence of states with common law that held to the
contrary. The AAA’s Consumer Due Process Protocols 9 continued to be a cornerstone for
protecting the rights of consumers with new disputes arbitrating as individuals. This paper looks
at the AAA’s experience administrating class arbitrations from Bazzle to post-Concepcion from a
service provider’s perspective.

II.

B A Z Z L E A L L O WS C L A S S A R B I T R A T I O N A N D T H E A M E R I C A N
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION RESPONDS

When Greentree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle was decided in 2003, it was apparent that
arbitration would be presented with novel questions regarding whether a class could be certified
in arbitration and whether that question should be determined by the arbitrators. 10 The American
Arbitration Association recognized that its Commercial Rules then in effect, did not contain
procedures that would adequately address the issues that Bazzle suggests should be decided by
arbitrators; namely whether an arbitration clause permits class proceedings and if it does, what
procedures should be followed for the resolution of the class’ claims. Arbitration had been, up to
that point, an event primarily between individual parties and several multi-parties. Another
consideration was the Class Arbitration Panel - what qualifications, experience and training
should members of this panel possess?
On October 8, 2003, the American Arbitration Association developed its Supplementary
Rules for Class Arbitration 11 and selected a national panel to hear cases under the new
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Supplementary Rules in combination with the underlying AAA Rules. The Supplementary Rules
“shall apply to any dispute arising out of an agreement that provides for arbitration pursuant to
any of the rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) where a party submits a
dispute to arbitration on behalf of or against a class or purported class.” In the Supplementary
Rules, arbitrators first review the arbitration clause and then issue a partial final award
determining whether the clause can permit class action arbitration. In the next phase, using the
standards generally provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, arbitrators decide whether
the class can be certified and issue a reasoned partial award. If the determination is that the class
should be certified, the arbitrators will then hear the merits of the case and issue a final award.
The Supplementary Rules provide that “at least one of the arbitrators shall be appointed from the
AAA’s national roster of class arbitration arbitrators.”12
A set of minimum qualifications was developed for the AAA Class Arbitration Panel that
includes: extensive class action experience - specifically where an individual has experience such
that a substantial portion of her practice is devoted to litigating class action matters in arbitration
or in other dispute resolution forums; experience with a broad range of practice areas and has
knowledge of recent class action court decisions; experience with class action litigation as a state
or federal judge; and extensive experience in conflict management and leadership role(s) in legal
professional association(s).
In order to ensure class action arbitration would be a public and transparent process, and
in an effort to protect absent class members, the AAA created a publicly available online docket
of all class arbitrations. This searchable online docket allows users to track cases through each
stage of the AAA Class Arbitration process, from the Clause Construction process through the
final award. 13 The names of the Claimants and their counsel as well as Respondent and their
counsel are shown on the title page of the case. Also on this page is the disposition of the case
and links to any activity including hearings, partial final awards, and dismissals. Additionally,
the AAA posted a policy statement concerning the class arbitrations:
Accordingly, the American Arbitration Association will
administer demands for class arbitration pursuant to its Supplementary
Rules for Class Arbitrations if (1) the underlying agreement specifies
that disputes arising out of the parties' agreement shall be resolved by
arbitration in accordance with any of the Association's rules, and (2) the
agreement is silent with respect to class claims, consolidation or joinder
of claims.
The Association is not currently accepting for administration
demands for class arbitration where the underlying agreement prohibits
class claims, consolidation or joinder, unless an order of a court directs
the parties to the underlying dispute to submit any aspect of their
dispute involving class claims, consolidation, joinder or the
enforceability of such provisions, to an arbitrator or to the
Association. 14
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III.

AAA’ S C L A S S A R B I T R A T I O N D O C K E T

Examination of the AAA’s Class Arbitration Docket reveals the activity of the 347 class
arbitrations filed with the AAA since the Bazzle decision in 2003. As of December 6, 2011, most
of these cases had been closed (248) with the remaining cases ongoing (98). Upon filing, the
cases were classified by the AAA as Commercial (182), Employment (133), and Construction
(32) and a special team of case managers began administrating the cases. After their selection,
the arbitrators conducted the Clause Construction phase to determine whether the arbitration
clause permitted arbitration under the Class Arbitration Supplementary Rules.
Nearly half of these cases (170) resulted in clause construction awards or stipulations; the
majority of these awards (110) interpreted the arbitration clause to permit class arbitration while
nineteen awards found the clause did not permit class arbitration. In an additional forty-one
stipulations parties affirmatively agreed that the arbitration could proceed on a class-wide basis.
Claims in fifty-six cases out of the 151 cases that could move forward were still at issue after the
Clause Construction phase.
Settlements were reached in 131 cases; thirteen settled with consent awards and 118
settled without consent awards. The arbitrators certified slightly more than half the cases that
proceeded to the Class Certification phase (29) and denied certification to the remaining classes
(22) with an additional five cases reaching class certification by stipulation between the parties.

IV.

S T O L T - N I E L S E N : T H E E F F E C T O N AAA’ S C L A S S A C T I O N S

The Stolt-Nielsen decision created uncertainty in the class arbitrations being administered
by the AAA at the time and an expected paucity of future filings. Arbitrators in the midst of the
Clause Construction phase in particular were faced with new law mid-case. Arbitrators
approached this new set of circumstances by allowing parties to bring forward arguments
reflecting Stolt-Nielsen. Respondents in some ongoing cases successfully argued the Court’s
ruling in opposing a class process in Clause Construction and Class Certification phases.
In fact, the filing of class arbitrations did not cease post-Stolt-Nielsen as parties filed
fifty-three class arbitration cases with AAA after the Court’s decision. Because parties may still
file demands for class arbitration under AAA’s Class Arbitration Rules, Claimants have
continued to seek class arbitration, often arguing to distinguish their case from that of StoltNielsen. These arguments are based in limitations of the applicability of Stolt-Nielsen because
the case was a business-to-business dispute rather than the present consumer or employee case.
Or, parties argued that while the outcome was based on the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 15
there were state contract law principles that would permit class arbitration. Or, parties cited a
unique fact that existed in Stolt-Nielsen in that the parties stipulated that the arbitration clause was
silent concerning class action:
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But the panel had no occasion to "ascertain the parties'
intention" in the present case because the parties were in complete
agreement regarding their intent. In the very next sentence after the
one quoted above, the panel acknowledged that the parties in this case
agreed that the Vegoilvoy charter party was "silent on whether [it]
permit[ted] or preclude[d] class arbitration," but that the charter party
was "not ambiguous so as to call for parol evidence." Ibid. This
stipulation left no room for an inquiry regarding the parties' intent, and
any inquiry into that settled question would have been outside the
panel's assigned task. 16

V.

P O S T -C O N C E P C I O N : W H E R E W E A R E N O W A T AAA

After Concepcion, the class arbitration landscape was changed further by the Court’s
explanation of its ruling in Stolt-Nielsen as well as its holding concerning class action waivers.
While Stolt-Nielsen addressed whether the Federal Arbitration Act permits class action
proceedings where the contract did not expressly allow them, Concepcion decided whether the
FAA requires the enforcement of an explicit class action waiver in light of state law that would
hold to the contrary:
Although we have had little occasion to examine classwide
arbitration, our decision in Stolt-Nielsen is instructive. In that case we
held that an arbitration panel exceeded its power under §10(a)(4) of the
FAA by imposing class procedures based on policy judgments rather
than the arbitration agreement itself or some background principle of
contract law that would affect its interpretation. 17

As an alternative to filing a class action demand, members of the would-be class may
instead file as individuals under AAA’s Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related
Disputes 18 based on AAA’s Consumer Due Process Protocols. 19 This Protocol guarantees due
process by assuring the right to representation, forbidding businesses from requiring an
inconvenient forum, and cost-shifting from consumers to businesses. And, the Protocols require
there be no limitations on damages, a neutral decision maker, and access to small claims court
should a consumer prefer that forum. 20
The cost-shifting is arguably one of the most important guarantees of due process and
access to justice for these claimants. Consumers with claims of $10,000 or less pay one-half the
arbitrators compensation but no more than a maximum of $125, and for claims of more than
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$10,000 but less than $75,000, consumers pay a maximum of $375. 21 All other arbitration fees
and arbitrator compensation are paid by businesses; compliance is ensured by a requirement that
AAA receive, review, and approve the arbitration clauses of these contracts prior to their use and
a further requirement that the clauses maintain their compliance with the due process protocols.
Cases arising out of contracts with clauses not in compliance are refused administration by the
AAA.
The AAA also makes data concerning the consumer cases it administrates available on its
website as a quarterly report indicating participants, claims activity, and costs of the individual
arbitrations. The current file posted on AAA’s website, 22 shows data from the third quarter of
2011 and contains 64,471 records from 61,843 cases.
Northwestern University Law School’s Searle Civil Justice Institute Task Force on
Consumer Arbitration conducted a study of AAA consumer cases in 2009 and concluded in
summary:
•

Consumers won some relief in 53.3% of the cases they filed and recovered an
average of $19,255; business claimants won some relief in 83.6% of their cases
and recovered an average of $20,648.

•

No statistically significant repeat-player effect was identified using a traditional
definition of repeat-player business. 23

The Report also discussed the important issue of costs and access for consumers involved
in individual arbitrations with businesses, in the case of AAA arbitrations where consumers filed
demands against businesses.
The upfront cost of arbitration for consumer claimants in cases
administered by the AAA appears to be quite low.
In cases with claims seeking less than $10,000, consumer
claimants paid an average of $96 ($1 administrative fees + $95
arbitrator fees). This amount increases to $219 ($15 administrative fees
+ $204 arbitrator fees) for claims between $10,000 and $75,000. These
amounts fall below levels specified in the AAA fee schedule for lowcost arbitrations, and are a result of arbitrators reallocating consumer
costs to businesses.
AAA consumer arbitration seems to be an expeditious way to
resolve disputes. 24

While businesses may be increasingly drawn to arbitration in the consumer area as a
result of Concepcion, these businesses must ensure their compliance with the AAA’s Due Process
21
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protocols for consumer and employment disputes. The Searle study found that in practice,
consumers participating in AAA arbitrations under the Consumer Due Process Supplement
actually paid less than the fees specified in the AAA Rules.25
Under AAA’s Rules, consumers may also choose not to arbitrate post-dispute and instead
select the option of filing in small claims court for claims up to the jurisdictional limits of the
court. The AAA Commercial Rules provide a carve-out for consumer-related disputes whether
filed by the consumer or the business.26 In California the small claims court’s limit of $7,500 per
claim and a general rule requiring self-representation can make this an attractive option for
consumers, especially with the free small claims advisor service the state provides to explain
court and enforcement procedures, help with claim or defense preparation, work out payment
plans, and answer other questions. 27

VI.

THE RESPONSE TO CONCEPCION

One salient factor of Concepcion is the provision in the arbitration clause for cases
where Claimants recover more from the arbitrator than the last, best offer from AT&T. A selfimposed penalty of $10,000 and payment of attorney’s fees provides Claimants with small claims
with a sizeable potential recovery for the small claim sizes that are customary in class litigation
and arbitration. In the Court’s view, these two factors demonstrate the likelihood a dispute will
be resolved without the necessity of the Claimants banding together as class actions. The Court
notes:
“Indeed, the District Court concluded that the Concepcions
were better off under their arbitration agreement with AT&T than they
would have been as participants in a class action, which “could take
months, if not years, and which may merely yield an opportunity to
submit a claim for recovery of a small percentage of a few dollars.”
Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *12. 28

Since Concepcion allowed AT&T’s class action waiver to stand, certain law firms filed
hundreds of individual arbitrations against AT&T aimed at stopping the company’s bid to merge
with a competing wireless provider and AT&T responded by filing suit in the Southern District of
New York 29 seeking to stop them from filing many individual arbitration demands with AAA,
one of which is “388 paragraphs in length and contains 641 footnotes.” 30 AT&T argued these
claims should not be decided in arbitration because they were brought under the Clayton Act. 31
The company cited its clause’s provision that consumers were allowed to bring claims only in an
“individual capacity” and not as a “class member in any purported class or representative
proceeding” 32 and noted that a Florida court granted AT&T Mobility a preliminary injunction in a
25
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similar case finding “the customers' arbitration demands ‘bear the hallmarks of a class action.’” 33
The Southern District of New York court added “the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a
clause both requiring that arbitration proceed on an individualized basis and prohibiting any form
of class or representative action.” 34
In the end, the court in Gonello ruled that the attempt to stop the merger was outside the
scope of the arbitration clause because “the parties withheld from the arbitrator the power to
decide questions that would necessarily affect the rights of more than the parties to the dispute
through the grant of declaratory or injunctive relief.” 35 Nonetheless, AT&T found itself arguing
the other side of arbitrability from its position in Concepcion.

VII.

SUMMARY

In summary, while the Court’s decisions in Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion appeared to
some to be a death knell for class arbitration, in practice there seems to be life for parties seeking
a class arbitration dispute resolution process and for lawyers representing large numbers of
consumers seeking redress for claims against businesses by bringing forward many individual
small claims that businesses are required to pay for under the American Arbitration Association’s
Consumer Due Process Protocols.

33

Id. at *8 n.1.
Id.
35
Gonnello, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116420, at *4.
34

88

